Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? By introducing the concept of approximate substitute players in non-cooperative games we are able to put a bound on the rationality of such social conformity for an arbitrary game and arbitrary number of societies.
Introduction
The economic literature is increasingly addressing the question of whether a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to behave as if rational or nearly rational. A standard way to look at this issue is to study the evolution of play when players are repeatedly matched to play a stage game and where, in each period, each player use a simple heuristic or 'rule of thumb' (Young 1993 , Blume 1993 , Ellison and Fudenberg 1995 . Underlying most such heuristics are two characteristics that seem intuitively appealing in any model of bounded rationality, namely, that players (1) only use pure strategies and (2) there is social conformity. By social conformity we mean that individuals conform to observed strategy choices of some group of similar individuals. In this paper, we ask whether, and when, such behavior can be consistent with individual rationality. We address this issue by determining, for an arbitrary game: (a) a bound on the irrationality of using pure strategies, that is, more technically, how large " must be, as a function of the parameters describing a game, for the existence of an "-equilibrium in pure strategies and; (b) a bound on the irrationality of using pure strategies that exhibit social conformity as a function of the parameters describing the game. In modelling social conformity we introduce the notion of endogenous roles and discuss how the existence of these roles may imply social conformity amongst individuals who are not necessarily playing the same actions. In characterising games we also lead to provide a de…nition of similarity amongst players or, in other words, to de…ne when players can be seen as near substitutes for each other. In a companion paper (Cartwright and Wooders 2002 ) the results of this paper are applied to provide a general class of large games where the use of both pure strategies and social conformity can be consistent with boundedly rational behavior.
There are two fundamental observations motivating the notion that people only use pure strategies and not (non-degenerate) mixed strategies. The …rst observation is the fact that a person never has a strictly positive incentive to play a mixed strategy; given the strategies of the other players, the payo¤ from playing a mixed strategy can always be achieved by playing one of the pure strategies in the support of that mixed strategy. 1 The second 1 This rationale will depend on the game in question. Von Neumann and Morgentsern (1944), for example, point out that in zero sum games, such as matching pennies, randomization can be a deliberate ploy to leave ones opponent guessing ones intentions. In many games, however, mixed strategy equilibria re ‡ect the inability of players to coordinate actions, as in, for example, the battle of the sexes. Justifying the use of mixed strategy equilibria in these cases is much harder.
observation is the seeming inability of people to generate random sequences. Thus, even when players use strategies that may look like mixed strategies in terms of the variance in observed actions the actions may not actually be chosen at random (see Kagel and Roth 1995 and Walker and .
There is little experimental literature in economics questioning whether social conformity plays a role in individual choice behavior. The psychology literature, however, supports the idea that people do have a tendency to conform to the actions of similar people. In an economic context there are many ways to explain such behavior. For example, if a person is boundedly rational or has imperfect information then he may imitate a person he believes is better informed (Gale and Rosenthal 1999, Schleifer 2000) . Alternatively, in a coordination game with multiple equilibria, a player may be able to make a more informed strategy choice by observing the actions of others (Scharfstein and Stein 1990 Ellison and Fudenberg 1995 , Young 2001 ). Finally, due to normative in ‡uences, a person may be motivated by desires for prestige, popularity or acceptance or more generally, to '…t in' with a social norm (Bernheim 1994) . It is worth highlighting that the psychology literature suggests that players only conform with the actions of others who they see as similar to themselves. With respect to the causes for conformity above, we can see some justi…cation for this. For example, a person may not seek to gain prestige amongst those he views as very di¤erent to himself.
It would appear, from the above, that the use of pure strategies and conformity may appropriately be elements of models of bounded rationality, particularly, in games with many players. Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001) , WCS, demonstrate that for a broad class of large games such behavior can be consistent with boundedly rational behavior. There are two important limitations to WCS. First, only games of complete information are treated; the limitations of this approach will become clear as we proceed. Second, the framework is restricted to noncooperative pregames. A noncooperative pregame, like a cooperative pregame or a pre-economy is a structure that enables one to treat large …nite games. 2 The shortcoming of the pregame framework is that it does not treat an individual game in terms of parameters describing the game. Moreover the results have limitations imposed by the pregame framework. One such limitation is that the social conformity result of WCS cannot treat social conformity in games where, ex-post, all players are identical.
In this paper we treat individual games and, in terms of the parameters describing a game, determine the lowest possible bound on " for a given game to have a Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies exhibiting social conformity.
To describe a game, we …rst introduce the notion of approximate substitute players of a non-cooperative game. This is a counterpart to the notion of approximate substitutes in cooperative games (Kovalenkov and Wooders 2001 , for example). We also de…ne the concept of a (±; Q)-class game. A (±; Q)-class game has the property that the player set can be partitioned into Q classes of players. Players in the same class are seen as approximate substitute players, where the dissimilarity of players in a class is bounded by the parameter ±. A (±; Q)-class game also is required to have a sort of 'large game' property; the e¤ect of a change in strategy of just one member of a class on the remaining players in the game must be small. This would be a natural property of standard models of large exchange economies games or large economies with local public goods or clubs, as in Kovalenkov and Wooders (1997) , for example. We note that any …nite game is a (±; Q)-class game for any Q and some ±. An advantage, therefore, of introducing the notion of a (±; Q)-class game is that it allows us to draw conclusions on arbitrary games for an arbitrary level of conformity, as measured by Q.
The …rst conclusion we draw relates to the use of pure strategies and can be, informally, stated as if a game ¡ is a (±; Q) class game then, for any "¸4± the game has a Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result allows us to put a lower bound on the size of " permitting existence of an "-equilibrium in pure strategies for an arbitrary game (with a …nite player set). Alternatively, the value of 2± could be interpreted as a bound on the distance from full rationality of players using pure strategies as opposed to mixed strategies.
To address social conformity, we de…ne a society as a collection of players in the same class and playing the same strategy. An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that if a game ¡ is a (±; Q) class game then, for any "¸4± there exists a Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies that induces a partition of the player set into no more than QK societies, where K is the number of strategies. This is essentially the analogue of the social conformity result due to WCS.
In the context of incomplete information there are other natural notions of social conformity. In particular, we may wish to permit the possibility that players in the same society perform di¤erent actions. We motivate this view with two examples. First, consider the example of driving automobiles on roadways with the choice of whether or not to give way at road junctions. We may think of the strategies in this instance as 'to give way' or 'not give way'. We would not want to interpret those players who give way as being part of a di¤erent society to those who do not give way. It may be that each player in the population conforms to the behavior of 'agree to a classi…cation into major and minor roads and obey a highway code that dictates giving way at minor roads and not giving way at major roads'. What we observe in this scenario is that players who use di¤erent actions can still be thought of as belonging to the same society; their choice of action is conditional upon the role they are playing in society at any one instance, i.e. whether they are on a minor road or road.
As a second example consider the division of labour within a large …rm (or university, or economy). Let the choice of job be the strategy. In equilibrium we may …nd a variety of strategy choices, with some people working in …nance and others in engineering for example. The interpretation that there exists a society of …nance workers and a distinct society of engineers is a much more intuitively justi…able one in this instance; there may be distinct …nance and engineering departments, for instance. We may still, however, wish to take the view that all of the members of this …rm belong to the same society, namely, the …rm; the fact that di¤erent people have di¤erent jobs merely re ‡ects the di¤ering roles they take within the …rm or society.
In both the above examples the 'aggregate strategy' of the society looks like a mixed strategy. Indeed the players within the society may also play mixed strategies. If we do not require that players choose pure strategies we demonstrate that if a game ¡ is a (±; Q) class game then for any "¸4± there exists a Nash "-equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into no more than Q societies. That is, there exists a Nash "-equilibrium with the property that any two players of the same class play the same mixed strategy. The key point to note is how the number of societies no longer depends on the number of strategies K. This suggests a higher level of social conformity.
A large literature, which we review in a later section, is concerned with the puri…cation of mixed strategy equilibria through incomplete information. In particular, in a game of incomplete information a player's action can be made conditional on her randomly determined type. In this way a player's chosen action may vary, and resemble a mixed strategy, even though she may play a pure strategy. It is conventional to assume that there is some exogenous uncertainty that makes this possible, for example uncertainty over payo¤s (Harsanyi 1973) . In contrast, we assume that players within a society can endogenously create incomplete information by creating a set of roles to which players in that society are randomly assigned. The players within the society choose the probability distribution with which they are assigned to roles. We now interpret a society as a set of players with the property that all players in the society (a) are in the same class, (b) have the same probability of being assigned each role, and (c) play the same pure strategy, where action choice may be conditional on role. We derive the following result if a game ¡ is a (±; Q) class game then for any "¸10± there exists a Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies that induces a partition of the player set into no more than Q societies.
We see that if players have some way of endogenising types, that is allocating players to di¤erent roles within the society, then each player can play a pure strategy and yet the number of societies need not be conditional on the number of strategies. This result suggests a higher level of conformity is possible than shown by WCS. We should, however, check that in allowing players to endogenise roles we still retain an interpretable and intuitive notion of a society. One key point to highlight in terms of the de…nition of a society is that two players within a society have the same probability distribution with which they are assigned to roles. It is non-trivial that players should desire this and it seems to be a criterion that requires players within a society to share some 'common plan' even if they perform di¤erent actions within that plan. In the driving example, for instance, this requirement could be interpreted as requiring that everybody in the population agrees on a classi…cation on roads into major and minor roads.
The division of labour example raises a further issue. It is possible that players are only likely to ever take one role within the society. This raises the question of whether expected utility is a relevant criteria on which to judge individual rationality. In particular, while all members of the society agree before the allocation to roles, will there be the same agreement ex-post once players are aware of the role that they have been allocated? Recent results due to Kalai (2000) suggest that this issue need not be a concern. In particular, any Nash "-equilibrium is likely to be ex-post stable in the sense that following the allocation of players to roles no one individual will have an incentive to change her behavior.
The approximate substitute framework allows us to draw conclusions about arbitrary games. It is also useful to have some general examples of (±; Q) class games for arbitrary values of ±. In a companion paper (Cartwright and Wooders 2002) we extend the pregame framework of WCS to allow incomplete information and to permit local interaction. We are able to connect the concept of games with approximate substitutes to that of games induced by a pregame satisfying the large game property. This allows us to apply the results of this paper in terms of arbitrarily small ".
We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the notation and Section 3 de…nes the notion of approximate substitutes. Section 4 looks at approximate puri…cation and Section 5 considers social conformity. Section 6 looks at social conformity in pure strategies, Section 7 looks at related literature and Section 7 concludes.
A Bayesian Game -de…nitions and notation
A Bayesian game ¡ is given by the tuple (N; A; T; p; u) where N is a …nite player set, A is a set of action pro…les, T is a set of type pro…les, p is a set of player beliefs and u the a set of utility functions. We de…ne these in turn.
Let N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite player set. For all i 2 N there exists a …nite set T i of feasible types of player i and a …nite set A i of feasible actions of player i (independent of type). Let T = £ i T i be the set of type pro…les and let A = £ i A i be the set of action pro…les. We assume throughout, for convenience, that T i = T and A i = A for all i 2 N and for some …nite sets T and A. We will typically index a type as t z 2 T and an action as a l 2 A.
Each player can make their action conditional on their type. Thus, a pure strategy of a player i is given by a vector s k = fs k (t 1 ); :::; s k ¡ t jT j ¢ g where s k (t z ) is interpreted as the action chosen by player i when she is of type t z . For any player i we allow choice of any pure strategy consistent with the set of feasible types T and actions A. 3 Denote the set of pure strategies by S where we let K = jAj jT j = jSj be the number of pure strategies. A strategy (possibly non-degenerate) of a player i is given by a vector ¾ i = f¾ i1 ; ::::; ¾ iK g where ¾ ik is interpreted as the probability player i plays pure strategy s k 2 S. A strategy ¾ implies a vector f¾ i (¢jt 1 ); :::; ¾ i (¢jt jT i j )g where ¾ i (¢jt i ) is interpreted as a probability distribution over the set of actions A to be used by player i when of type t i . The value ¾ i (a i jt i ) is interpreted as the probability player i uses action a i given he or she is of type t i . Let ¢(S) denote the set of strategies for player i. Given strategy ¾ i let support(¾ i ) denote the pure strategies played with strictly positive probability. Let S = £ i2N ¢(S) denote the set of strategy vectors. We refer to a strategy vector ¾ as degenerate if ¾ i places unit weight on a unique pure strategy for all i 2 N.
Let C = T £ A denote the feasible compositions of player i. That is, a composition is a type-action pair. Let C = £ i2N C denote the set of composition pro…les. For each player i 2 N there exists a utility function u i : C ! R. The interpretation is that u i (c) denotes the payo¤ of player i if the composition pro…le is c. We will typically index a composition as c r 2 C. Let u = fu 1 ; ::::; u n g denote the set of player utility functions.
Each player i 2 N forms her own beliefs about the types of other players as given by a function p i . The function p i is a probability distribution over the set of type pro…les T . The value p i (t) is interpreted as the probability player i puts on the type pro…le being t. We refer to p i as the beliefs of player i about the type pro…le. With a slight abuse of notation let p i (t ¡i jt i ) denote the probability that player i puts on the type pro…le being t = (t ¡i ; t i ) 2 T given that he is of type t i . We assume the marginal distribution p i (t i = t z ) is strictly positive for all t z 2 T and all i 2 N. That is, player i puts a strictly positive probability on being of each possible type. Let p = fp 1 ; :::; p n g be the set of beliefs about the type pro…le.
For the most part we make no assumptions about beliefs as given by set p. We occasionally, however, will make reference to two some standard assumptions on player beliefs. For each player i 2 N there exists some prior probability distribution over types g i . That is, g i (t i ) denotes the probability that player i is of type t i 2 T if the types of the remaining players Nnfig are undetermined. Let g denote a probability function over the set of type pro…les. Thus, g(t) denotes the probability of type pro…le t 2 T . Two standard assumptions are 4 1. Independent type allocation: for all i 2 N, g i is independent of the type pro…le over the remaining players. That is, g(t) = Q i g i (t i ) where t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ).
2. Consistent beliefs: for all i 2 N and for all t i 2 T ,
Players are assumed to act according to expected payo¤s. In particular, knowing his type (but not the type of the other players), a player is assumed to choose an action which maximizes his expected payo¤. Given a strategy vector ¾ and beliefs about the type pro…le p i a player can form expectations about the likely composition pro…le. For instance, the probability that player i puts on composition c = ((a 1 ; t 1 ); :::; (a n ; t n )) is given by prob(c) = p i (t 1 ; :::; t n )¾ 1 (a 1 jt 1 ):::¾ n (a n jt n ).
Let U i (¢jp i ) denote the expected utility function of player i given beliefs p i mapping strategy vectors into the real line.
We note how the function U i accounts for both the uncertainty over player types, and the uncertainty due to mixed strategy vectors.
A strategy vector ¾ is a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium if,
for all s k 2 S and for all i 2 N. We say that a Bayesian Nash " equilibrium m is a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies if m i is degenerate for all i.
Approximate substitutes
Given a Bayesian game ¡ = (N; T; A; p; u) we consider partitioning the player set N into subgroups with the property that any two players in the same group can be viewed as approximate substitutes for each other. This requires us to formulate a metric by which to compare players. In cooperative game theory the distance between players is typically measured by the maximum di¤erence in value that players can add to coalitions. Informally, in cooperative game theory a ±-substitute partition has the property that, given any coalition structure, 'swapping' players who are ±-substitutes between coalitions, has an e¤ect of less than ± on the worth of the coalitions. In proposing the analogue in non-cooperative games we consider two di¤erent ways of measuring the distance between players. Informally, we say that two players i and j are interaction substitutes if i and j are seen as similar by those with whom they interact. In contrast, we say that players i and j are individual substitutes if they have similar payo¤ functions. Combining both measures together, we refer to players i and j as approximate substitutes if they are both interaction and individual substitutes. We formally introduce these terms below. We consider two players i and j as being approximate interaction substitutes when the payo¤ to any player k is relatively invariant if player's i and j exchange strategies. Formally, a partition fN 1 ; :::; N Q g is a ±-interaction substitute partition for Bayesian game ¡ when for any two strategy vectors
for all N q and all s k 2 ¢(S), then,
for any player i 2 N and any strategy s k 2 ¢(S).
A second measure we put on the distance between players is the similarity of their payo¤ functions. In particular, a partition fN 1 ; :::; N Q g is a ±-individual substitute partition for Bayesian game ¡ when for any N q , for any two players i; j 2 N q and for any strategy vector ¾ 2 S such that
We say that a partition N = fN 1 ; :::; N Q g is a ±-substitute partition if N is both a ±-interaction substitute partition and a ±-individual substitute partition. In this instance we say that two players belonging to a subset N q are ±-substitutes for each other.
We make some observations. First, it is trivial that any Bayesian game ¡ has a 0-substitute partition ff1g; :::; fNgg. That is, each player is a 0-substitute for themselves. We also note that for any Bayesian game ¡ and any Q · N there exists a ±-substitute partition for some …nite ±¸0. Further, partitions into a larger number of subsets will typically reduce the minimum value of ± for which there exists a ±-substitute partition. Formally, if game ¡ has a Q member ±-substitute partition then for any Q where N¸Q¸Q there exists a ± · ± such that ¡ has a Q member ± substitute partition. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that players are 0-substitutes for themselves.
A (±; Q)-class Bayesian game
We begin this section by de…ning a third type of partition. This can be seen as a measure of how invariant a player's payo¤ can be to changes in the strategy vector. Formally, a partition fN 1 ; ::::; N Q g is a ±-strategy switching partition when for any two strategy vectors
for all N q and all s k 2 S then
The de…nition of a ±-strategy switching partition requires us to put a maximum bound on the change in payo¤s when, essentially, Q players, one from each class, change strategy. It should be clear that, unlike the previous two types of partition, the smaller is Q then the smaller is likely to be the value of ± for which there exists a ±-strategy switching partition. It is unlikely that there will be a 0-strategy switching partition. In contrast to de…ning ±-substitutes there is no real intuitive justi…cation for putting two players together into a subset of a ±-strategy partition. We note, however, that how the player set is partitioned can signi…cantly e¤ect the minimum ± for which the partition is a ±-strategy partition. Also, as we show in example A it is often the case that 'opposites' should be grouped together. That is, players we would see as opposite in terms of the two similarity criteria above. This would suggest that a partition of the player set into approximate substitutes need not be a 'good' partition when viewed on the criteria of a strategy switching partition. This is an issue we explore in the next sub-section after de…ning a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game.
We say that a Bayesian game ¡ is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game if there exists a Q member partition fN 1 ; ::::; N Q g that is a ± I -interaction substitute partition, a ± P -individual substitute partition and a ± C -strategy switching partition. We say that a Bayesian game ¡ is a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game if ¡ is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game where ± I ; ± P ; ± C · ±. We refer to each N q as a class of player and say that two players i; j 2 N q are the same class of player.
In summary, if a game is a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game then the population can be partitioned into classes such that any two players in the same class are ±-substitutes. Furthermore, a player's payo¤ changes by at most ± if 'one player' from each class changes strategy.
Discussion
To illustrate the notion of a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game consider the two extreme cases highlighted below. For this discussion we assume the game is one of complete information with player set N where jNj = n. Let fN 1 ; ; ; :N Q g denote a partition of the player set into classes. First, suppose that jN q j = 1 for all i 2 N and so Q = n. As we have highlighted, this is a 0-substitute partition. Note, however, that …nding a ± for which there exists a ±-strategy switching partition would require comparing strategy vectors ¾ 1 and ¾ 2 in which any player i 2 N can change their strategy any way they wish. Thus, unless the game is trivial, it cannot be a (±; N)-class Bayesian game for any meaningful value of ±. Indeed, in general ± would have to be as large as the maximum possible di¤erence between the expected payo¤s of a player.
In contrast, suppose that jN 1 j = n and so there is only one class of player. It is now much more unlikely that there will exist a ±-substitute partition for a relatively small value of ±. This would require that payo¤s depend only on the 'population average' or the number of players playing each strategy. This is plausible (such an assumption is used in Kalai 2000, for example), and not as restrictive as it may seem but in general is a strong assumption. Suppose, however, there does exists a 1-member ±-substitute partition of ¡. It seems likely that in this scenario ¡ will be a (±; 1)-class Bayesian game. The reason being that if jNj is 'large' then …nding a ± for which there exists a ±-strategy switching partition would only require comparing strategy vectors ¾ 1 and ¾ 2 in which the strategies of players are slightly perturbed. Informally, if payo¤s are only a function of the population average then we would expect players to be relatively indi¤erent to small changes in this population average.
Between these two extremes we clearly …nd a trade o¤ between a small or large number of classes Q. In particular, for an arbitrary game ¡, …nding the minimum ± for which ¡ is a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game would seem to involve a trade-o¤ when varying the size of Q. If Q is large then it seems more plausible there should exist a ±-substitute partition for small ± while if Q is small then it seems more likely that there should exists a ±-strategy switching partition for large ±. This issue is illustrated by Example A which appears in the appendix. This example also serves to demonstrate how for any game ¡ and for any Q the minimum value of ± such that ¡ is a (±; Q)-class game can be calculated.
Games with incomplete information
In de…ning a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game the role of incomplete information is not explicit. It is useful to o¤er an illustration of the possible role incomplete information can play. We assume throughout this subsection that beliefs are both independent and consistent. We highlight the following issue: if two players i and j use the same or similar strategies then this does not necessarily imply that their expected composition is similar. This is because the prior probability distribution over types of players i and j may di¤er. Thus, even though players i and j play similar strategies the expectations of what will be realized, in terms of their type and action, may be dissimilar.
Consider the de…nition of a ±-interaction substitute partition. This definition requires comparison of the di¤erence in payo¤ from two strategy vectors ¾ 1 ; ¾ 2 2 S where,
for every member of the partition N q . Given two such strategy vectors we can compare the probability that a typical player of any class N q will have type t z and play action a l . Formally, given strategy vector ¾, let pr(¾; N q ; t z ; a l ) denote the expected probability that a player of class N q will be of type t z and play action a l . We note that,
Thus,¯p
It is clear that this inequality may be binding. For example, suppose that there are two players 1 and 2 in a class N q . Player 1 is always of type t 1 and player 2 is always of type t 2 . That is, g 1 (t 1 ) = g 2 (t 2 ) = 1. What we learn from this discussion is how the de…nition of a ±-interaction substitute partition, and also a ±-strategy switching partition, implicitly measures the variability in prior operability distributions over types and the importance of such variations on payo¤s. In particular, if a game is to be a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game for small ±, then we would expect that either players of the same class have similar prior probability distributions over types or payo¤s are relatively invariant to the type pro…le. This, however, seems a reasonable assumption; an assumption of common priors, for example, makes such issues irrelevant.
Puri…cation of mixed strategies
Our …rst result places a bound on the rationality of using pure strategies. To derive this result we require three lemmas which are stated and proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 1: Let ¡ = (N; A; T; p; u) be any Bayesian game that is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game. Let " be a positive real number where "¸2(± I + ± C ). The game ¡ has a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: Using Nash's Theorem there must exist a Nash Equilibrium strategy ¾ ¤ . This implies, for all i 2 N, that,
for all ¾ i where support(¾ i ) ½support(¾ ¤ i ) and for all s k 2 ¢(S). Given that ¡ is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class game there is a partition of N into Q classes. Let fN 1 ; :::; N Q g be a such a partition of N. We apply Lemma 2 in turn to each N q . Doing so implies that there exists a strategy vector
for all q = 1; :::; Q. Thus,¯X
for all s k 2 S and all q. By Lemma 3 this implies that there exists a strategy vector ¾ such that
From the de…nition of a ±-interaction substitute partition we have that,
for any player i 2 N and any strategy s k 2 ¢(S). By the de…nition of a ±-strategy switching partition we have that,
for any player i 2 N and any strategy s k 2 ¢(S). Thus, for any s k 2 ¢(S) and for all i 2 N¯U
Therefore, given (5),
for all i 2 N and all s k 2 ¢(S).¥
We note that the value of ± P has no e¤ect on the bound for which there exists a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium. That is, the existence of an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not require that players in the same class should have similar payo¤ functions. This will not be the case when we consider social conformity below.
As previously remarked, any game ¡ is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game for some ±. Theorem 1 allows us, therefore, to put a bound on the rationality of using pure strategies as opposed to mixed strategies. An important issue is, of course, how useful this bound is. Two simple examples illustrate some of the issues.
Example 1.
The number of players is given by 1; 000; 001. Player 1 is labelled the leader and players 2 to 1; 000; 001 are labelled citizens. The citizens play a sort of matching pennies game with the leader. There are two pure strategies H and T . The strategy of the citizens is de…ned as the mean average strategy of the citizens; thus, if 500; 000 citizens choose to play H and 500; 000 choose T the strategy of the citizens is to play H with probability one half and to play T with probability one half. The payo¤ matrix is as follows where a citizen receives a payo¤ according to the strategy of the citizens, strategy of citizens
Thus, if the leader chooses H and the strategy of the citizens is T the leader gets a payo¤ of ¡1 and each citizen gets a payo¤ of 1.
This game has no Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies for any value of " < 2. It is trivial to note that there is no strategy ± C -switching partition of the player set for any value of ± C signi…cantly below 2. Thus, Theorem 1 shows there exists a Bayesian Nash 4-equilibrium.T he …rst thing we observe in this example is that the use of pure strategies does not appear to be boundedly rational. The primary reason for this is that one player, namely the leader, can signi…cantly alter the payo¤s of other players. We also see that the bound provided by Theorem 1 is a significant overestimate. Indeed, given that payo¤s only range between 1 and ¡1 we can immediately conclude there exists a Bayesian Nash 2-equilibrium. 6 Generally, as in Example 1, the bound on " given in Theorem 1 is unlikely to be binding. To explain, we begin by highlighting that the method of proof is one of 'purifying' a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. With this in mind we see that while the de…nition of a (±; Q)-class Bayesian game requires us to compare any two strategy vectors of a game, in reality, demonstrating the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium merely requires us to look at strategy vectors 'near to' any mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A second reason why Theorem 1 is unlikely to be binding is motivated by an example. Suppose there exists a mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which a player i plays a pure strategy A with probability 0:01 and a strategy B with probability 0:99. The proof of Theorem 1 allows for the possibility that player i, after the puri…cation, may end up playing strategy A with probability 1. Indeed, while one player having to switch in this manner is plausible, the proof of Theorem 1 permits that every player in the population may have to switch strategies to this extent. This seems unlikely to ever have to be the case.
That the bound on " provided by Theorem 1 will typically be an overestimate does not prevent Theorem 1 of being of use in demonstrating cases where the use of pure strategies is boundedly rational. A simple example illustrates this point.
Example 2.
The situation is virtually identical to that in Example 1 except the game is now played between two di¤erent groups of citizens, that is, there is no longer a leader. Suppose that there are 1; 000; 002 players with equal numbers in each group. The game has no Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies for any value of " below 1=500; 001. Theorem 1 implies that there exists a Bayesian Nash 4=500; 0001 equilibrium.Ï n Cartwright and Wooders (2002) by using a pregame framework we provide a general class of large game for which Theorem 1 shows the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies. We discuss this further in Section 7.
Social conformity
We begin by de…ning a society. Take as given a game ¡ = (N; A; T; p; u), a partition of N into classes fN 1 ; :::; N Q g and a strategy vector ¾ 2 S. For any strategy s k 2 ¢(S) and any q, de…ne the subset N k q of N such that i 2 N k q if and only if i 2 N q and ¾ i = s k . If N k q is non-empty then we refer to the set N k q as a society. Thus, a society is (a maximal set) such that every player belonging to that society plays the same strategy and has the same class. Given a partition of N into classes N = fN 1 ; :::; N Q g and a strategy vector ¾ 2 S there exists a unique partition fN 1 ; ::::; N C g of the player set N into societies. We say that N and ¾ induce the partition into societies fN 1 ; ::::; N C g.
Given a Q member partition into classes N we say that a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium m is a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium with social conformity if N and ¾ induce a partition into Q societies. That is, any two players in the same class play the same strategy.
Suppose that players can choose mixed strategies. This may appear unmotivated in view of the previous focus of the paper. The main motivation will become clear, however, in the following section. Theorem 2 is also an interesting result in its own right in focussing purely on the bounded rationality of social conformity.
Theorem 2: Let ¡ be any (± I ; ± P ; ± C )-class Bayesian game. Let " be a positive real number where "¸2(± I + ± P ). The game ¡ has a Bayesian Nash " equilibrium m with social conformity.
Proof: By Nash's existence of equilibrium Theorem there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium ¾ ¤ of the game ¡. Given that ¡ is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C )-class Bayesian game there exists a partition N =fN 1 ; :::; N Q g that is both a ± Iinteraction substitute and ± P -individual partition. For each N q and for each s k 2 S let ¾ ¤ (q; k) be de…ned as
Consider a strategy vector m satisfying the property that, for all i 2 N, if i 2 N q then m ik = ¾ ¤ (q; k); the strategy vector m assigns each player some pure strategy in his best response set. Clearly N and m induce a partition into societies fN 1 ; :::; N Q g.
It is trivial that
for all q and all s k 2 S. Given that ¾ ¤ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and N a ± I -interaction substitute partition
for all i 2 N and all s k 2 ¢(S). Given that N is a ± I -individual substitute partition¯U
for any players i; j 2 N q for some q and for any s k 2 ¢(S). Given the construction of m it must be the case that
for all i 2 N and all s k 2 ¢(S). This completes the proof.¥ Theorem 2 shows that if players are allowed to use mixed strategies then each class can be taken as a society; thus, the number of societies can be bounded by the number of classes. That is, if ¡ is a (±; Q) class game then for any "¸4± there exists a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium such that any two players belonging to the same class play the same strategy. We note that the value of ± C is irrelevant for the bound on which there exists a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium with social conformity.
We note that Theorem 2 encompasses the special case in which Q = n. In this case, there exists a 0-substitute partition and so there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which there are n societies. This is, of course, just an immediate application of the Nash Existence Theorem. In interpretation of Theorem 2 this observation makes clear that we need to have some notion of how large classes need to be.
Making judgements on how many people a class should have is clearly somewhat arbitrary. Indeed a class size of one may not be unreasonable; this may re ‡ect players who choose not to conform. The model of conformity used by Bernheim (1994), for example, leads, in some instances, to a 'central' group of people who conform around a standard norm with other 'extreme' individuals choosing 'to do their own thing' by not conforming to such a norm.
We propose two ways in which the issue of class size can be, at least partially, overcome. First, by moving to a pregame framework the number of classes can be …xed independently of the size of the player set. This is pursued further in Cartwright and Wooders (2002) as discussed in Section 7. Second, the concept of ex post stability can be used to give a criterion for judging how large a class need be. We pursue this further in the next section.
Before continuing we brie ‡y return to consider Example 1. It is trivial that for the game in example 1 there is a partition into 2 classes which is both a 0-interaction substitute partition and a 0-individual substitute partition. Thus, Theorem 2 shows that there exists a Bayesian Nash 0-equilibrium in which the population is partitioned into two societies. We …nd in Example 1 a game for which the use of pure strategies cannot be considered boundedly rational while social conformity can be. This appears to be a fairly general property as illustrated in Cartwright and Wooders (2002) by applying Theorems 1 and 2.
Social conformity in pure strategies
Having considered the rationality of using pure strategies in Section 3 and the rationality of social conformity in Section 4, we now turn to the rationality of both social conformity and the use of pure strategies. We can begin with a result that follows immediately from Theorem 1 and should need no proof.
Corollary 1: Let ¡ be a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game. Let " be a positive real number where "¸2(± I +± C ). The game ¡ has a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium m in pure strategies and partition of N into Q classes such that N and m induce a partition into societies fN 1 ; :::; N C g where C · QK. This is clearly an immediate consequence of the fact that any partition of the player set N into societies induced by a partition of N into Q classes must have no more than QK societies. This result, however, can still be of interest if the number of societies can be …xed independently of the size of the player set. This is possible using the pregame framework of Wooders et al. (2000) . 7 We note that given the type of conformity in Corollary 1 there may be players in the same class who are playing di¤erent pure strategies. We interpret such players as belonging to di¤erent societies. As highlighted in the introduction, in certain circumstances such a distinction may not be appropriate. We thus wish to suggest alternative notions of conformity in pure strategies.
A large literature (reviewed in Section 7) has shown that incomplete information may permit the puri…cation of mixed strategies. In particular, given that action choice can be conditional on type, a player can use the randomness in his type to randomize over his actions even when playing a pure strategy. The possibility of such puri…cation is dependent on su¢cient randomness of the type pro…le (Aumann et al. 1983 ); for example, such puri…cation is not possible if there is perfect information.
We now assume that players can endogenously create imperfect information if su¢cient randomness does not exist. In particular, given a Bayesian game ¡ we consider a Bayesian game with endogenous roles ¡(f). We assume that there exists a set of roles R = fr 1 ; :::; r K g. The number of roles is as large as the number of actions. Let R = R n be the set of role pro…les. We assume that there exists a probability distribution over the set of role pro…les f : R ! [0; 1]. We also assume, throughout the remainder of the paper, that beliefs are consistent and independent. Given a Bayesian game ¡ = (N; A; T; g; u) a Bayesian game with endogenous roles ¡(f ) = (N; A; T (f); g(f); u(f)) is de…ned to satisfy:
2. g(f)(t; r) = g(t)f(r) for all t 2 T and all r 2 R, 3. u i (f)(a; t; r) = u i (a; t) for all a 2 A, t 2 T , r 2 R and all i 2 N.
The reader can observe that roles are basically equivalent to types. A player can, for instance, make action choice conditional on her role. Further, players are assumed to have consistent beliefs with respect to the conditional distribution over role pro…les. One important distinction between a role and a type is that a player's role can have no e¤ect on his payo¤ or the payo¤ of any other player.
Roles are signals through which players can coordinate their actions. There is an equivalence between the roles as de…ned here and the signals players are assumed to receive in de…ning correlated equilibria. We discuss this equivalence further in Section 7. We will not provide a 'story' of how these roles come to be an accepted means of coordination, or how they are assigned to players, but merely take as given the set R and function f. As we will discuss in section 7, this is not atypical in the literature.
We place an important restriction on the form that the probability distribution over roles f can take. To do so, we take as given a partition fN 1 ; :::; N Q g of the player set into classes. A probability distribution over roles f satis…es within class anonymity if the probability that a player from a class N q will have role r k is identical for all players belonging to the class. Formally, if i; j 2 N q for some q then, X r2R:
for all r k 2 R. We assume that any Bayesian game with endogenous roles ¡(f) has a probability distribution of roles f satisfying within class anonymity.
The importance of within class anonymity lies in how we interpret a society. A society, in a Bayesian game with endogenous roles, is de…ned, as before, as a maximal set of players such that every player in the society plays the same strategy and is of the same class. Given that actions can be conditional on role, in such a Bayesian game, we have to be careful to retain a meaningful notion of a society. In particular, does the fact that players within the same society play the same strategy imply that they can be seen as conforming to some norm or of sharing some common identity? The assumption of within class anonymity would suggest so. This is because, while there are di¤erent roles within the society and players with di¤erent roles may perform di¤erent actions, each player is equally likely to take each role within the society.
The presence of roles implies that mixed strategies can be puri…ed by making action conditional on role. This allows us to model conformity in pure strategies more generally. Indeed an immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is the following.
Corollary 2: Let ¡ be any (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game. Let " be a positive real number where "¸2(± I +± P ). There exists a partition N of the player set into Q classes and a Bayesian game with endogenous roles ¡(f ) (where f is within class anonymous) such that ¡(f) has a Bayesian Nash " equilibrium m in pure strategies with social conformity.
This result demonstrates that if players have some endogenous system by which players can be assigned roles then we can conceive of societies in which players play di¤erent actions. Within this framework the number of societies is again equal to the number of classes. Thus, any two players of the same class play the same strategy.
Example 1 raises some questions about how to interpret Corollary 2. In particular, Corollary 2 suggests that roles can be used to imply the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game of Example 1. This is a conclusion that is di¢cult to justify. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires the leader to play each strategy with probability one half and the existence of roles really seems to do nothing to purify this strategy.
To try and overcome such problems we use the concept of ex-post information proofness as introduced by Kalai (2000) . A composition pro…le c is said to be " information proof if for all i 2 N u i (c)¸u i (a k ; t i ; c ¡i ) ¡ " for all a k 2 A. A strategy pro…le ¾ is said to be a Bayesian Nash " information proof equilibrium if it yields an " information proof composition pro…le with probability one. If a strategy is a Bayesian Nash information proof equilibrium then, as discussed further by Kalai (2000) , no player would wish to change their action after knowing the types (roles) and the actions of the other players. This seems to be a highly desirable property. We note that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Example 1 is not information proof; once the action of the leader is revealed some of the citizens would wish to change their strategy. In seeking to show the existence of a Bayesian Nash information proof equilibrium we assume a particular form to the probability distribution over types. Given a partition into classes fN 1 ; :::; N Q g and given a role pro…le r let h(r; k; q) be the number of players in class q who have role r k . We say that a probability distribution over roles f is within class determined if for any class q and for any two role pro…les r and r, if f(r); f(r) > 0 then h(r; k; q) = h(r; k; q) for all classes q and for all r k 2 R. Thus, irrespective of the role pro…le, the number of players in each class that will have each role is determined. For example, a husband and wife may have the choice of going out to work or doing the housework. If the distribution of roles is within class determined then it follows that one of them stays at home and does the housework while the other goes out to work. Chance will decide which person takes which role.
Consider a game ¡(f) where f is within class determined and within class anonymous and consider a Bayesian Nash "-equilibrium with social conformity m of that game. The equilibrium m is such that every player within the same class has the same probability of being assigned each role. Further, two players of the same class assigned the same role will play the same action. Finally, the number of players in each class who will be assigned each role is known with certainty. It seems intuitive that we could interpret m as an equilibrium with social conformity; certainly the players appear to be conforming to some standard of behavior and it also appears that players could learn by imitation in such a society.
We note that a probability distribution over the set of role pro…les f that is within class determined suggest a high level of coordination amongst members of a society. It would appear to suggest the presence of some central coordinating body. This is, however, not unrealistic as Example 3 below illustrates. We should also note that players can receive higher payo¤s from a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of game ¡(f), if f is within class determined, than they could from game ¡. This is similar to the way in which payo¤s form a correlated equilibria can exceed those of Nash equilibrium in the same game. This suggests a reason why roles may endogenously evolve.
We now state our …nal result. We note that the values of ± I ; ± p and ± C all …gure in the bound on rationality provided in Theorem 3. This contrasts with Theorems 1 and 2. We also note that we assume ¡ is a game of perfect information; this could easily be relaxed subject to a relaxation on the level of information proofness.
Theorem 3: Let ¡ be any (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class Bayesian game with perfect information. Let " be a positive real number where "¸2(2± I + ± P + 2± C ). There exists a partition N of the player set into Q classes and a Bayesian game with endogenous roles ¡(f ) (where f is within class anonymous and within class determined) such that ¡(f) has a Bayesian Nash " information proof equilibrium m in pure strategies with social conformity.
Proof: From Theorem 1 the game ¡ has a Bayesian Nash 2(± I + ± C ) equilibrium in pure strategies m. Given that game ¡ is a (± I ; ± P ; ± C ; Q)-class game let N = fN 1 ; :::; N Q g be a partition of N into classes. For any strategy pro…le s let h(s; k; c) be the number of players i such that i 2 N q and s i = s k .
Consider any strategy pro…le m such that h(m; k; q) = h(m; k; q). Pick an arbitrary player i 2 N q . Suppose that m i = s k . There must exist some player j 2 N q such that,
for all s k 2 ¢(S). Thus, given that N is a ± I -interaction substitute partition,
for all s k 2 ¢(S). Let m be such that m j = m i and m l = m l for all l 6 = j. We note that
It follows, given N is a ± P -individual substitute partition, that,
for all s k 2 ¢(S). Further, given that N is a ± C -strategy switching partition,
The statement of the theorem is now more or less immediate. Let f be such that for any role pro…le r 2 R, if f (r) > 0 then h(r; k; q) = h(m; k; q). Then let everybody in the population have the pure strategy (for Bayesian game with endogenous roles ¡(f)) which says 'play action a l if role r l '.¥ We …nish this section with an example.
Example 3:
This example concerns driving on roadways. The players choose between two actions -'give way' (G) or 'not give way' (N). Players from a large population are randomly matched to play the stage game with payo¤ matrix player 2 G N player 1 G 0; 0 0; 2 N 2; 0 ¡2; ¡2
Players are not able to distinguish amongst each other. Thus they must play the same strategy against any opponent they meet. A player's payo¤ is the sum of payo¤s received from playing each stage game.
Without any roles the only outcome we would expect is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes in giving way half of the time and not giving way otherwise. The result is a lack of coordination with 'crashes' happening on one in four occasions.
Suppose there exists two roles -'to be on a major road' and 'to be on a minor road'. On each meeting one player is selected to be on a major road and one to be on a minor road. Each player can play the pure strategy 'if on a minor road give way and if on a major road do not give way'. Using these roles we see conformity in pure strategies amongst the whole population.T his example highlights many issues. First, players are able to realize average payo¤s of 1 which would not be possible without roles. This in turn suggests a reason why a set of roles, or a highway code, would evolve. We note, however, that for such a set of roles to evolve we would ultimately appear to need some central coordinating body to classify roads as major and minor. Finally, we note that the probability distribution over role pro…les in this example is within class determined; there is always one person on a minor road and one on a major road.
Relationships to the literature
A large related literature addresses the possible motivations for players to use mixed strategies (a recent paper on this topic is Govindan, Reny and Robson 2002) . The central issue is whether a mixed strategy equilibrium can be seen as approximately equivalent to a pure strategy equilibrium. This is plausible because imperfect information, and the resultant exogenous uncertainty, make explicit randomization unnecessary. Aumann at el. (1983) provide su¢cient conditions, on the exogenous uncertainty, such that any mixed strategy vector can be approximately puri…ed. Harsanyi (1973) argues that a game with perfect information should be considered as an idealization of nearby games in which there is a small amount of payo¤ uncertainty. Harsanyi (1973) shows that such uncertainty implies any mixed strategy equilibrium can be approximately puri…ed.
This literature would suggest that for a wide class of games and for any mixed strategy equilibrium of such games there exists an approximately equivalent pure strategy equilibrium. This may appear to generalize the results in this paper as our results suggest there are games for which an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. Further, this remains the case even when we allow players to introduce some exogenous uncertainty. The literature, however, is concerned with questioning the motivations of rational players while the focus of this paper is one of questioning the bounded rationality of using pure strategies. The implications of this di¤erent approach are felt in both the assumptions of social conformity and that the number of roles is no larger than the number of actions. For example, it is typical of the literature, as in Aumann et al (1983) and Harsanyi (1973) , to assume a continuum of types. It is di¢cult to envisage a boundedly rational player being able to condition actions on a continuum of types.
The model of this paper is also related to the literature on correlated equilibria (for an introduction see Myerson 1997) . Correlated equilibrium are motivated as re ‡ecting the incentives on players to coordinate their actions. For example, in a Battle of the sexes game the two players can coordinate their actions by utilizing exogenous signals. Such signals may re ‡ect pre-play communication or readily observable 'sunspots'. Theorem 3 could be interpreted as showing the existence of an approximate correlated equilibrium with conformity. As above, however, we can point to a slight di¤erence in emphasis between this paper and the literature. In particular, the literature on correlated equilibria is motivated by considerations of how rational players can coordinate their actions. Roles, as introduced in this paper, are motivated by considerations of how boundedly rational players may be able to approximate rational behavior through conformity.
A further related literature concerns the evolution of institutions (see, for example, Durlauf and Young 2001, Young 2001 and references therein). This literature addresses the question of how conventions or institutions can evolve, through individual interactions, to create coordination on a large scale. Such a literature helps in understanding how roles could become endogeneised in the way we assume in this paper.
We conclude this section by relating the results of this paper to those of Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001) and Cartwright and Wooders (2002) . take as given a non-cooperative pregame, consisting of three elements -a space of attributes, -, a set of pure strategies S, and a payo¤ function h. A component of attribute space -is a complete description of the possible characteristics of a player. The set of pure strategies S is assumed to be …nite. The payo¤ function h determines a payo¤ function for any player in any game derived from the pregame. Given any …nite player set N and and an attribute function ® ascribing an attribute to each player, the pregame induces a game ¡(N; ®) on the population (N; ®) determined by N and ®. A set of players, all with attributes in some convex subset of attribute space and all playing the same pure strategy is interpreted as a society. Roughly, the main result of WCS demonstrates that for any " > 0, for any su¢ciently large game induced by the pregame satisfying a certain 'large game property,' there exists an "-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and this equilibrium induces a partition of the player set into at most J(")K societies, where J(") is …xed independently of the size of the player set. This result establishes properties of a set of games where both the use of pure strategies and social conformity can be consistent with rational behavior.
The approach of has the virtue of providing a general class of games where the use of pure strategies and social conformity is boundedly rational. This contrasts with the results of this paper which, while applying to any game, only provide a bound on the rationality of such behavior given certain properties of the game. In Cartwright and Wooders (2002) we connect the concepts of a pregame induced by a large game prop-erty and that of a (±; Q)-class game. Doing so allows us to apply the results of this paper. In particular, it allows us provide a general class of game that are (±; Q)-class games for arbitrarily small ± and …xed number of societies Q. By applying the results of this paper we are also able to signi…cantly generalise the results of WCS. For example, we demonstrate conformity in pure strategies even if all players are identical. Further, we relax the requirement of a global interaction assumption to one of local interaction.
Conclusion
This paper introduces the concept of approximate substitutes in non-cooperative games. Doing so allows us to put a bound on the rationality, or irrationality, of using pure strategies and of social conformity. We us a de…nition of a society which allows players within the same society to perform di¤er-ent actions. Thus, players who are conforming to some norm may perform di¤erent actions. This is possible through imperfect information and the existence of roles. In particular, players can make action choice conditional on their role and roles are assigned to players randomly. Thus, players in the same society can play the same strategy and yet perform di¤erent actions. To retain a meaningful notion of society we impose two restrictions on how roles are allocated; …rst, while roles are assigned randomly the number of players in a society who will have each role is not random; second, any player in the same society must have the same probability of being assigned each role. We argue that players within the same society can be seen to conform to some norm or convention. In research in progress, we relate our results to the experimental research of Friedman (1996) and Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (1997). the good A that will be produced is given by,
The amount of good B produced is given by,
Each player i 2 N has the same payo¤ function. The payo¤ function for any player i 2 N is given by,
for any s k 2 ¢(S) and any strategy vector ¾. That is, a player's payo¤ is simply the per capita amount of both goods produced. This completes the de…nition of the game.
Given any partition N of the player set into Q classes we can calculate the minimum ± for which the game above is a (±; Q)-class game. We illustrate with three partitions.
First, suppose that Q = 1; that is, there exists a unique class. Consider the two strategy vectors ¾ 1 ; ¾ 2 2 § such that ¾ 1 = (B; B; B; B; B; A; A; A; A; A) and ¾ 2 = (A; A; A; A; A; B; B; B; B; B). For example, given strategy ¾ 1 player 1 produces good B with probability 1. Given that a(¾ 1 ) = b(¾ 1 ) = 40 and a(¾ 2 ) = b(¾ 2 ) = 15 we have that,
This shows that for Q = 1 there exists no ±-interaction substitute partition for any ± · 4:9. It is clear that there does exist a ±-interaction substitute partition for any ± > 4:9. It is easily checked that this also implies ¡ is a (±; 1)-class game for any ± > 4:9.
Moving to the other extreme suppose that Q = 10; that is, each player is there own class. We have already noted there will exist a 0-substitute partition. By re-using the two strategy vectors ¾ 1 and ¾ 2 above we see, however, that ¡ is not a (±; 10)-class Bayesian game for any ± · 4:9. It is a (±; 10)-class for any ± > 4:9.
Suppose, …nally that we set Q = 3 where N 1 = f1; 2; 3; 4g and N 2 = f5; 6g. To …nd a ±-interaction substitute partition we compare a strategy vector It follows that there is a ±-substitute partition for any value of ± > 1:7.
Compare two strategy vectors ¾ 1 = (B; B; B; B; B; A; A; A; A; A) and ¾ 2 = (A; B; B; B; B; B; A; A; A; B). We can calculate that,
This leads us to claim that ¡ is a (±; 3)-class Bayesian game for any ± > 1:9.
For each value of Q, by looking at all partitions of the player set into Q subsets we can calculate the minimum value of ± such that the game is a (±; Q)-class game. This value of ±, as a function of Q, is plotted in Figure  1 below with more details given in Table 1 . The minimum value of ±, for which there exists a ±-substitute partition or ±-strategy switching partition can also be calculated as a function of Q. These are also plotted in …gure 1 with more details given in Tables 2 and 3 .
In Figure 1 we see the trade-o¤ between a large and small value of Q. If Q is large then there exists ±-substitute partition for small ±. These partitions, however, do not imply the game is a (±; Q)-class game for small ±. Each class has relatively few players and so payo¤s are not near-invariant when one player from each class changes strategy. By contrast, if Q is small then the ± for which there exists a ±-substitute partition is larger. This simply re ‡ects the fact that we are grouping together players with more diverse attributes. Given, however, that the number of players in a class is now relatively large any ±-substitute partition is likely to be a (±; Q)-class game.
It is interesting to highlight that the Q member partition which implies the minimum ± for which there is a ±-substitute partition may di¤er from the Q member partition consistent with the minimum ± for which the game is a (±; Q)-class game. For example, set Q = 9. The partition in which players 5 and 6 are put in the same subset is a 0:2-substitute partition. By using this same partition we can say that the game is a (4:9; 9)-class game but cannot put a lower bound on ± than 4:9. Consider the partition in which players 1 and 10 are put together. This partition is only a 1:8-substitute partition, however, this partition demonstrates that the game is a (4:1; 9)-class game. Q partition values of ± such that a ±-substitute partition 1 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10g > 4:9 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g f6; 7; 8; 9; 10g > 2:4 3 f1; 2; 3g; f4; 5; 6; 7g; f8; 9; 10g > 1:6 4 f1; 2g; f3; 4; 5g; f6; 7; 8g; f9; 10g > 1:2 5 f1; 2g; f3; 4g; f5; 6g; f7; 8g; f9; 10g > 1:0 6 f1; 2g; f3g; f4; 5; 6g; f7; 8g; f9g; f10g > 0:8 7 f1g; f2g; f3g; f4; 5; 6g; f7; 8g; f9g; f10g > 0:6 8 f1g; f2g; f3g; f4; 5g; f6; 7g; f8g; f9g; f10g > 0:4 9 f1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f10g f5; 6g; f7g; f8g; f9g > 0:2 10 f1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g; f8g; f9g; f10g¸0 Q partition values of ± such that a ±-strategy switching partition 1 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10g¸0:9 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 7; 8; 9; 10g; f6g¸1 3 f1; 2; 3; 4; 7; 8; 9; 10g; f5g; f6g¸1 :1 4 f1; 2; 3; 8; 9; 10g; f4; 7g; f5g; f6g¸1 :4 5 f12; 3; 8; 9; 10g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g¸1 :7 6 f12; 9; 10g; f3; 8g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g¸2 :2 7 f1; 2; 9; 10g; f3g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g; f8g¸2 :7 8 f1; 10g; f2; 9g; f3g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g; f8g¸3 :4 9 f1; 10g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g; f8g; f9g¸4 :1 10 f1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5g; f6g; f7g; f8g; f9g; f10g¸4 :9
Proof of Theorem 1
First, we introduce some notation. Given a strategy vector ¾ = (¾ 1 ; ::; ¾ n ) (where ¾ i = (¾ i1 ; :::; ¾ iK ) 2 ¢ K for i = 1; :::; n) let M(¾) denote the set of strategy vectors m = (m 1 ; ::; m n ) such that for all i = 1; :::; N, 1. support(m i ) ½support(¾ i ) for all i 2 N and, 2. m i is degenerate.
Informally, given a strategy vector ¾ the strategy vector m 2 M(¾) if, for all i, strategy m i is such that player i plays some pure strategy s k 2support(¾ i ) with probability one.
Our main result makes use of the following Lemma from Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2001), Lemma 1 (Wooders, Cartwright, Selten): For any strategy vector ¾ = (¾ 1 ; :::; ¾ n ) and for any vector g 2 Z K + such that P i ¾ i¸g ; there exists a vector m = (m 1 ; :::; m n ) 2 M(¾) such that:
We extend Lemma 1. First, we introduce further notation. Given real number h let bhc denote the nearest integer less than or equal to h and dhe the nearest integer greater than or equal to h (i.e. b9:5c = 9 and d9:5e = 10 etc.). Given vector h denote by bhc the vector such that bhc k = bh k c for all k with a similar de…nition for dhe.
Lemma 2: For any strategy vector ¾ = (¾ 1 ; :::; ¾ n ) there exists a strategy vector m = (m 1 ; :::; m n ) 2 M(¾) such that: 
We then introduce the following sets W t and L t , t = 0; 1; 2; :::, where we allow the possibility that t = 0; 1. Suppose there exists a k ¤ 2 L such that
Given the chain of players fi 0 ; i 1 ; :::; i t ¤ g 2 W given above, consider the vector m ¤ constructed as follows, It is easily checked that the vector m ¤ 2 M(¾) leads to the desired contradiction by reducing by one the value C. We note, however, that Therefore,
Thus, ¾ is a strategy vector. We note that for all s k 2 K ¡ ,
Clearly, for all s k 2 K + we have that
and for all
This completes the proof.¥
